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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 387 
\VoRKMEN's COMPENSATION-THIRD-PARTY AcnoNs-EMPLOYER's R.Ecov-
ERY ON AN IMPLIED WARRANTY-Plaintiff seeks to recover the amount of 
a workmen's compensation award paid to his employee as a result of in-
juries received when an exhaust valve malfunctioned causing a press which 
the employee was operating to double-trip. Defendant, an independent 
parts supplier who had sold plaintiff the valve, moved to dismiss the com-
plaint because of insufficiency of evidence to sustain the verdict and plain-
tiff's legal incapacity to sue. On appeal from an order denying the motion 
to dismiss, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. Plaintiff has two inde-
pendent causes of action, one against the manufacturer on an assigned 
negligence theory,1 and another against the supplier for breach of implied 
1 N. Y. WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAw § 29 (2) provides: "If such injured employee .•. has 
taken compensation under this chapter but has failed to commence action against [a 
third party] within the time limited ... , such failure shall operate as an assignment of 
the cause of action against such other to . • . the person, association, corporation, or 
insurance carrier liable for payment of such compensation.'' 
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warranty of fitness, the damages in either case to be measured by the 
amount of compensation the employer paid to his employee. General 
Aniline & Film Corp. v. A. Schrader & Son, 13 App. Div. 2d 359, 215 
N.Y.S.2d 861 (1961) (per curiam) . 
At common law it was well established that the employer could sue 
the supplier of a defective product for his damages on an implied warranty 
of fitness. The foreseeable damages included sums which the employer was 
legally obligated to pay an injured employee as a result of a suit brought 
by the employee against him plus any property damage caused by the 
defective product.2 Since the advent of workmen's compensation acts the 
employer's main opportunity to recoup the losses directly attributable to 
a third party's negligence has been through a subrogation procedure con-
tained in most compensation acts.3 Generally, this procedure allows an 
employer to maintain a lien on any recovery from an action by his em-
ployee against the third-party tortfeasor up to the amount of compensation 
paid;4 or under certain conditions, the employer is subrogated to the cause 
of action possessed by his employee with which he may pursue the negli-
gent manufacturer.5 This type of action under the various acts is ex delicto 
and not ex contractu as is the case with an implied warranty recovery. 
The subrogation procedure is almost exclusively used by an employer in 
attempting to recover the amount of compensation paid out under the 
act. Thus, the question is raised in the principal case whether an em-
ployer can bring an implied warranty of fitness action to recover this same 
amount paid to the injured employee under the New York Workmen's 
Compensation Law. 
One of the major factors contributing to confusion in this area is the 
great variety of compensation statutes which govern the employer's rights 
against third parties. At one extreme, some statutes clearly specify that 
any action by an innocent employer against a third party who caused 
injury to his employee must be based on the subrogation procedure which 
allows only an action for personal injuries.6 On the other hand, there are 
statutes which can be construed as not to restrict the employer's remedy 
2 Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901); 
London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Strait Scale Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15 S.W.2d 766 (1929), 64 A.L.R. 
936; John Wanamaker, New York v. Otis Elevator Co.; 228 N.Y. 192, 126 N.E. 718 
(1920). 
3 Ohio and West Virginia do not have subrogation clauses. 
4 2 LARsON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 71.20 (1952) . 
5 Ibid. 
6 "Where both employer and employee have elected to come under this act, the 
provisions of this act shall be exclusive, and such election shall be held to be a sur-
render by such employer and such employee . . . of their right to any other method, 
form, or kind of compensation, or determination thereof .•.• " MONT. REv. CoDES 
ANN. § 92-204 (1947). See WASH. REv. CODE § 51.24.010 (Supp. 1959). 
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but to allow recovery on any grounds possessed by the employer.7 Be-
tween these approaches range a number of statutes capable of being in-
terpreted to correspond with either view, and the New York act is one of 
these.8 The courts have pursued opposite lines of reasoning in interpreting 
the statutes. First, there is a strong desire to prevent the double recovery 
against a negligent manufacturer which might result from a personal injury 
suit by the employee and an action by the employer for breach of warranty 
of fitness.0 Secondly, the courts find it distasteful to abrogate a common-
law right when this would result in freeing from liability the supplier who 
would otherwise have been held liable, and placing the entire burden on 
the innocent employer.10 
The principal case attempts to harmonize the subrogated negligence 
cause of action with one based on implied warranty. The court feels that 
the concern over multiple recovery is easily resolved by proper court 
procedures.11 Another factor which neutralizes the double recovery prob-
lem is that section 29 of the New York statute admits the possibility of two 
suits for a maximum period of six months. Under the provisions of this 
section the employee must bring his action against the negligent third party 
no later than one year after the injury occurred or within six months after 
claiming compensation, whichever period is shorter.12 Failure to bring a 
timely action bars any action by the employee against a third party. Should 
an employer seek to recover on a warranty theory he would find it difficult 
to prove the requisite damages until the employee obtained compensation, 
and therefore he would be encouraged to withhold his suit until the com-
pensation was awarded. On the other hand, if the employer's suit is brought 
7 FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (2) (1961) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23.1101 (1950). 
8 N.Y. '\VoRKMEN's COMP. LAW § 29. 
o Sec Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948); Murray v. Dewar, 
6 Wis. 2d 411, 94 N.W.2d 635 (1959); United States Cas. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 
N.J. 157, 72 A.2d 190 (1950). See also 2 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 77.10-.20; 
McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabilities and 
Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TE.XAS L. R.Ev. 389, 450-51 (1959); Comment, 2 STAN. L. 
R.Ev. 810 (1950); Comment, 8 WASH.&: LEE L. REv. 124 (1951). 
10 See Dayton Power &: Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 287 Fed. 439 (6th 
Cir. 1923), 37 A.L.R. 849 (1925); Johnson v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 613 (E.D.N.C. 
1955); Hyland v. 79 West Monroe Corp., 2 III. App. 2d 83, 118 N.E.2d 636 (1954); 
Foster & Glassell Co. v. Knight Bros., 152 La. 596, 93 So. 913 (1922) ; Midvale Coal Co. 
v. Cardox Corp., 152 Ohio St. 437, 89 N.E.2d 673 (1949). See also Sterling Aluminum 
Prods., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 140 F.2d SOI (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 761 (1944) 
which denied a contract recovery but only because of an odd historical development of 
the death statute and not because the compensation act precluded recovery. 
11 Principal case at 364, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 867. 
12 N.Y. WoRKMEN's COMP. LAw § 29 (1) provides: "If such injured employee ..• 
take or intend to take compensation ••• and desire to bring action against such other 
[third party committing the negligence or wrong], such action must be commenced not 
later than six months after the awarding of compensation and in any event before the 
expiration of one year from the date such action accrues." 
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after the employee's cause of action has expired, there is no possibility of 
double recovery since only the employer can sue the third party. Although 
the possibility of multiple recovery exists for a six-month period after 
the employee is compensated, since the employer has a lien on any re-
covery by the employee to the extent of the compensation award he would 
have little to gain in bringing an action himself during this period. In 
addition, simple joinder requirements would seem to preclude double re-
covery even during this period.13 
The majority opinion leaves unanswered, however, the question of the 
extent to which the new liability will be enforced since warranty recovery 
may expose to liability parties who would not have been liable at com-
mon law. This would occur either where the manufacturer-supplier is not 
negligent14 or where the manufacturer-supplier is negligent but the em-
ployee was contributorily negligent. In the former case, the manufacturer-
supplier would be liable to the employer for any payments made to the 
employee even absent negligence on the manufacturer's part. And since 
the workmen's compensation acts oblige the employer to compensate a 
larger number of injuries than were compensable at common law, the effect 
of the decision in the principal case is to pass on the expanded scope of lia-
bility to the manufacturer-supplier. In the contributory negligence situa-
tion the employee has no recourse against the negligent third party either 
at common law or under the workmen's compensation act. It has been 
held that the employer would have to pay the compensation award and 
yet not recover in tort since his contributorily negligent employee has no 
assignable cause of action.15 The principal decision clearly seems to allow 
the employer to proceed against the manufacturer-supplier ex contractu 
and to recover the exact amount of compensation paid. Thus, the no-
negligence case would broaden the scope of the common-law coverage 
while the contributory negligence case would develop a new area of lia-
bility.16 Moreover, the employer now has an additional three years in 
13 Section 258 of the New York Civil Practice Act allows joinder of independent 
and/or alternative causes of action; §§ 193 and 212 allow the joinder of third parties 
if complete relief can be given or if the causes of action stem from the same transaction. 
14 In New York there must be privity to allow a recovery for breach of an implied 
warranty of fitness; and therefore, without negligence, the employee cannot proceed 
against anyone except his emplo.yer. Canter v. American Cyanamid Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 
691, 207 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1960) . But cf. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 
30 U.S.L. WEEK 2421 (N.Y. Feb. 22, 1962). 
15 Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Amsterdam Color Works, 284 App. Div. 376, 131 N.Y.S.2d 
782 (1954), afj'd, 308 N.Y. 816, 125 N.E.2d 871 (1955) . 
16 The dissent questions this result at 366, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 868, "The plaintiff's 
cause of action against the appellant [supplier] is based on contract to recover for sums 
spent in compensating the employee for her injuries. The query is-Does an employer 
.•. have an action of [his] own, exclusive of the Workmen's Compensation Law, for 
recovery of sums paid to an injured employee against a third party on an ex contractu 
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which to pursue a supplier after any chance of recovery against the negli-
gent manufacturer has been barred by the New York statute of Iimita-
tions.17 This anomalous result flows from the fact that the employer's 
subrogated cause of action, as a personal injury suit, would be limited to 
three years,18 while he is allowed six years in which to bring a suit based 
on contract.19 It is not clear that the workmen's compensation law was 
designed to effect this result. 
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theory as distinguished from an ex delicto theory where the third party is one against 
whom an action could not be maintained by the employee?" 
17 2 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW Yorut PRACTICE 201 (1952). 
18 Massi v. Alben Builders, 270 App. Div. 482, 60 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1946), afj'd, 296 
N.Y. 767, 70 N.E.2d 746. 
10 2 CARMODY-WAIT, op. cit. supra note 17, at 200. 
